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Abstract 
Various forms of typed A-calculi have been proposed as specification languages for repre- 
senting wide varieties of object logics. The logikalframework, LF, is an example of such a 
dependent-type A-calculus. A small subset of intuitionistic logic with quantification over 
simply typed A-calculus has also been proposed as a framework for specifying general 
logics. The logic of hereditary Hamop formulas with quantification at all non-predicate 
types, denoted here as hhw, is such a meta-logic that has been implemented in both the 
Isabelle theorem prover and the AProlog logic programming language. Both frameworks 
provide for specifications of logics in which details involved with free and bound variable 
occurrences, substitutions, eigenvariables, and the scope of assumptions within object 
logics are handled correctly and elegantly at the "meta" level. In this paper, we show 
how LF can be encoded into hhw in a direct and natural way by mapping the typing 
judgments in LF into propositions in the logic of hhw. This translation establishes a 
very strong connection between these two languages: the order of quantification in an 
LF signature is exactly the order of a set of hhw clauses, and the proofs in one system 
correspond directly to proofs in the other system. Relating these two languages makes 
it possible to provide implementations of proof checkers and theorem provers for logics 
specified in LF by using standard logic programming techniques which can be used to  
implement hhw . 
1 Introduction 
The design and construction of computer systems that can be used to specify and imple- 
ment large collections of logics has been the goal of several different research projects. In 
this paper we shall focus on two approaches to designing such systems. One approach is 
based on the use of dependent-type A-calculi as a meta-language while another approach 
is based on the use of a very simple intuitionistic logic as a meta-language. The Logical 
In the L'Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Automated Deduction," July 1990. 
Framework (LF) [HHP87] and the Calculus of Constructions (CC) [CH88] are two ex- 
amples of dependent-type calculi that have been proposed as meta-logics. The Isabelle 
theorem prover [Pau89] and the AProlog logic programming language [NM88] provide 
implementations of a common subset of intuitionistic logic, called hhw here, that can be 
used to specify a wide range of logics. Both Isabelle and AProlog can turn specifications 
of logics into proof checkers and theorem provers by making use of the unification of 
simply typed A-terms and goal-directed, tactic-style search. 
In this paper, we shall show that these two meta-languages are essentially of the 
same expressive power. This is done by showing how to translate LF specifications and 
judgments into a collection of hhw formulas such that correct typing in LF corresponds 
to intuitionistic provability in hhw. Besides answering the theoretical question about the 
precise relationship between these meta-languages, this translation also describes how LF 
specifications of an object logic can be implemented using unification and goal-directed 
search since these techniques provide implementations of hhw . 
In Section 2 we present the meta-logic hhw and in Section 3 we present LF. Section 
4 presents a translation of LF into hhw and Section 5 contains a proof of its correctness. 
Section 6 provides examples of this translation and Section 7 concludes. 
2 The Meta-Logic 
Let S be a fixed, finite set of primitive types (also called sorts). We assume that the 
symbol o is always a member of S. Following Church [Chu40], o is the type for propo- 
sitions. The set of tgpes is the smallest set of expressions that contains the primitive 
types and is closed under the construction of function types, denoted by the binary, infix 
symbol -+. The Greek letters T and a are used as syntactic variables ranging over types. 
The type constructor + associates to the right. If TO is a primitive type then the type 
TI -+ . . . -+ T,, -+ TO has 71,. . . , rn as argument types and TO as target type. The order 
of a primitive type is 0 while the order or a non-primitive type is one greater than the 
maximum order of its argument types. 
For each type 7, we assume that there are denumerably many constants and variables 
of that type. Constants and variables do not overlap and if two constants (or variables) 
have different types, they are different constants (or variables). A signature is a finite 
set C of constants and variables whose types are such that their argument types do not 
contain o. A constant with target type o is a predicate constant. We often enumerate 
signatures by listing their members as pairs, written a: T, where a is a constant of type T. 
Although attaching a type in this way is redundant, it makes reading signatures easier. 
Simply typed A-terms are built in the usual way. The logical constants are given the 
following types: A (coiljunction) and > (implication) are both of type o -+ o -+ o; T 
(true) is of type o; and V, (universal quantification) is of type (T + o)  -+ o, for all types 
T not containing o. A formula is a term of type o. The logical constants A and > are 
written in the familiar infix form. The expression V,(Az t )  is written simply as V,z t .  
If x and t are terms of the same type then [t/x] denotes the operation of substitut- 
ing t for all free occurrences of x, systematically changing bouiid variables in order to 
avoid variable capture. The expression [ t l /x l , .  . . , tn/xn] will denote the simultaneous 
substitution of the terms t l ,  . . . , t n  for the variables XI , .  . . , x,, respectively. 
We shall assume that the reader is familiar with the usual notions and properties of 
a, p, and r )  conversion for the simply typed A-calculus. The relation of convertibility up 
t o  a and p is written as = p ,  and if r)  is added, is written as =p,. We say that a A-term is 
in P-normal form if it contains no beta redexes, that is, subformulas of the form (Ax t)s. 
A A-term is in Pqlong form if it is of the form 
Axl . . . Axn(htl . . . t,) (n,  rn 2 0) 
where h, called the head of the term, is either a constant or a variable, where the 
expression htl . . . tm  is of primitive type, and where each term t l ,  . . . , t m  are also in P g  
long form. All A-terms pg-convert to  a term in ,&-long form, unique up to  a-conversion. 
See [HS86] for a fuller discussion of these basic properties of the simply typed A-calculus. 
Let C be a signature. A term is a C-term if all of its free variables and nonlogical 
constants are members of C. Similarly, a formula is a C-formula if all of its free variables 
and nonlogical constants are members of C. A formula is either atomic or non-atomic. 
An atomic C-formula is of the form (Pt l  . . . t , ) ,  where n 2 0, P is given type TI + - .  . + 
rn + o by C, and tl ,  . . . , t ,  are terms of the types 71,. . . , r,, respectively. The predicate 
constant P is the head of this atomic formula. Non-atomic formulas are of the form T, 
B1 A B2, B1 > B2, or V,x B,  where B ,  B1, and B2 are formulas and r is a type not 
containing o. 
The logic we have just presented is very closely related t o  two logic programming 
extensions that have been studied elsewhere [MNPS]. First-order hereditary Harrop 
formulas (fohh) have been studied as an extension to first-order Horn clauses as a basis 
for logic programming. Similarly higher-order hereditary Hawop formulas (hohh) are a 
generalization of fohh that permits some forms of predicate quantification. Because our 
meta-language is neither higher-order, since it lacks predicate quantification, nor first- 
order, since it contains quantification a t  all function types, we shall simply call it hhw. 
The set of hh" formulas in which quantification only up to  order n is used will be labeled 
as hhn. 
Provability for hhw can be given in terms of sequent calculus proofs. A sequent is a 
triple C ; P - B ,  where C is a signature, B is a C-formula, and P is a finite (possibly 
empty) sets of X-formulas. The set P is this sequent's antecedent and B is its succedent. 
The expression B , P  denotes the set P U {B}; this notation is used even if B E P. The 
inference rules for sequents are presented in Figure 1. The following provisos are also 
attached to the two inference rules for quantifier introduction: in V-R the constant c is 
not in C, and in V-L t is a C-term of type T. 
A proof of the sequent C ; P - B is a finite tree constructed using these inference 
rules such that the root is labeled with C ; P - B and the leaves are labeled with 
initial sequents, that is, sequents C' ; P' - B' such that either B' is T or 3' E P'. 
The non-terminals in such a tree are instances of the inference figures in Figure 1. Since 
we do not have an inference figure for pq-conversion, we shall assume that in building 
a proof, two formulas are equal if they are pr)-convertible. If the sequent C ; P - B 
has a sequent proof then we write C ; P  I-I B and say that B is provable from C and P .  
C ;  B,C ,P  - C C ;  P - B C ; P  - C  
A- L A-R 
C ;  B A C , P  - C C ;  P - B A C  
C  ; [t,/z]B,P - C C  U {c: r}  ; P - [&/XI B v-R v- L 
C ;  V , x B , P  - C C ; P  - V T x B  
Figure 1: Left and right introduction rules for hhw 
We shall need only one proof-theoretic result concerning the meta-logic hhw. To state it ,  
we require the following definition. 
Definition 2.1 Let C  be a signature and let P be a finite set of C-formulas. The 
expression lPlc denotes the smallest set of pairs (G, D) of finite sets of C-formulas G and 
C-formula D, such that 
If D E P then (8 ,D)  E /Pic. 
If (G ,  Dl A Dz) E lPlc then ( G ,  Dl) E JPIc and (6 ,  Dz)  E (PIE. 
If (G,V,xD) E IPJE then ( G ,  [ t / z]D) E lPlc for all C-terms t of type r. 
If (G,G> D) E IPJc then (Gu{G) ,D)  E 1Pl-z. 
Theorem 2.2 A non-deterministic search procedure for hhw can be organized using the 
following four search primitives. 
AND: B1 A B2 is provable from C and P if and only if both B1 and B2 are provable 
from C and ?. 
GENERIC: V,xB is provable from C and P if and only if [c/x]B is provable from 
C U {C : T )  and P for any constant c : T not in C. 
AUGMENT: B1 > B2 is provable from C and P if and only if B2 is provable from C 
and P u (31). 
BACKCHAIN: The atomic formula A is provable from C and P if and only if there 
is a pair (G, A) E lPlc SO that for every G E G ,  G is provable from C and P.  
These formal results are closely related to the notion of expanded n o r m a l  f o r m  for 
natural deduction proofs [Pra71] which was used by Paulson in [Pau89] to establish the 
correctness of a specification of first-order logic in hhw. This theorem will similarly play 
a central role in proving the correctness of our representation of LF in hhw . 
3 The Logical Framework 
There are three levels of terms in the LF type theory: objects (often called just terms), 
types and families of types, and kinds. We assume two given denumerable sets of vari- 
ables, one for object-level variables and the other for type family-level variables. The 
syntax of LF is given by the following classes of objects. 
I< := Type 1 IIx:A.K 
A := x l I I x : A . B J A x : A . B J A M  
M := x1Az:A.M J M N  
I? := (} l I ' ,x:K JI? ,x :A 
Here M and N range over expressions for objects, A and B over types and families of 
types, I< over kinds, x over variables, and I? over contexts. The empty context is denoted 
by 0. We will use P and Q to range over arbitrary objects, types, type families, or kinds. 
We write A --+ P for IIx :A.P when x does not occur in type or kind P. We will say that 
a type or type family of the form xN1 . . . Nn where n > 0 and x is a type family-level 
variable is a f lat  t ype .  
Terms that differ only in the names of variables bound by A or II are identified. If x is 
an object-level variable and N is an object then [NIX] denotes the operation of substitut- 
ing N for all free occurrences of x, systematically changing bound variables in order to 
avoid variable capture. The expression [Nl/xl,.  . . , N,/x,] will denote the simultaneous 
substitution of the terms N1, . . . , Nn for distinct variables X I ,  . . . , x,, respectively. 
The notion of p-conversion at the level of objects, types, type families, and kinds 
can be defined in the obvious way using the usual rule for P-reduction at the level of 
both objects and type families: (Ax:A.P)N -+p [N/x]P where P is either an object or 
typeltype family. The relation of convertibility up to is written as = p ,  just as it is at 
the meta-level. All well-typed LF terms are strongly normalizing [HHP87]. We write PP 
to denote the normal form of term P. We present a version of the LF proof system that 
constructs only terms in canonical form, a notion which corresponds to ,@-long forms in 
the simply typed A-calculus. Several definitions from [HHP89] are required to establish 
this notion. We define the ar i t y  of a type or kind to be the number of Us in the prefix of 
its normal form. The arity of a variable with respect to a context is the arity of its type 
in that context. The arity of a bound variable occurrence in a term is the arity of the 
type label attached to its binding occurrence. An occurrence of a variable x in a term is 
fully applied with respect to a context if it occurs in a subterm of the form xM1 . . . M,, 
where n is the arity of x. A term P is canonical  with respect to a context r if P is in 
p-normal form and every variable occurrence in P is fully applied with respect to r .  We 
say that a context r is in canonical form if for every item x : P in I', P is in canonical 
form with respect to I?. Flat types of the form xN1 . . . Nn such that x is fully applied 
will be called base types .  
The following three kinds of asser t ions  are derivable in the LF type theory. 
I? k I< kind (I< is a kind in I') 
r t- A : K (A has kind I< in I') 
r t- M : A (M has type A in I') 
We write I? I- a for an arbitrary assertion, where a is called an LF judgment. For the 
special form r t A : Type of the second type of assertion, we also say A is a type in 
I?. A context x1 : P I . .  . ,xn  : Pn is said to be valid if X I , .  . . , x n  are distinct variables 
and for i = 1,. . . , n,  Pi is either a type or kind in context X I  : 4 , .  . . , xi-1 : Pi - I .  In 
deriving one of the above assertions, we always assume that we start with a valid context 
r. We sometimes refer to the context in such an assertion as a signature.' Generally, a 
signature is a set of variables paired with types or kinds that specify an object logic and 
its inference rules. 
The inference rules of LF are given in Figure 2. In (APP-OBJ) B must be a base type, 
r I- Type kind (TYPEKIND) 
I' t- A : T y p e  r ,  x : A  t K kind (PI-KmD) 
r I- IIx :A .K  kind 
r F A : Type r, x : A  b B : TYPE (pI-FAM) 
I' t Ilx:A.B : Type 
r t A : Type r, x : A  t- B : I< (ABkFAM) 
r I- Xx:A.B : IIx:A.K 
r I- A : Type r , x : A  t- M : 3 (ABS-OB J) 
r t- Xx:A.M : IIx:A.B 
n : n - I n - I n  (APP-FAM) 
r t x N 1 . .  .Nn : Type 
Figure 2: The Logical Framework 
and in (APP-OBJ) and (APP-FAM) n is the arity of x. In (PI-KIND), (PI-FAM), (ABS-FAM), 
and (ABS-OBJ), we assume that the variable x does not occur in T, and in (APP-FAM) 
and (APP-OBJ) we assume that the variables 1 1 , .  . . , xn do not occur free in N 1 , .  . . , N,. 
'Other presentations of LF such as [HHP87] separate the notions of context and signature. We unify 
them here for simplicity of presentation. 
6 
Note that bound variables can always be renamed to meet these restrictions. 
The main difference between this presentation and the usual presentation of the LF 
proof system are the (APP-FAM) and (APP-OBJ) rules. The rules in the form presented 
here are those needed to preserve the invariant that all objects, types, type families, 
kinds, and contexts in derivable judgments are in canonical form. To see why, first note 
that no new P-redexes are introduced in the conclusion of these rules. The application 
introduced in the left term of the judgment in the conclusion is always a variable applied 
t o  zero or more terms, while the right term is always P-normal. Second, note that the 
signature item x of arity n is applied in the conclusion to  n terms and thus this occurrence 
of x is fully applied. Hence, as  long as N1,. . . , Nn are canonical, so is xN1 . . . Nn. In 
the (APP-OBJ) rule, the fact that the type ([Nl/xl, .  . . , Nn/xn]B)@ is canonical follows 
from the fact that for any object, type, type family, or kind P and any object M, if 
P and M are canonical, then so is ([M/x]P)@. Based on these observations, derivable 
assertions can be characterized more formally as follows: if J? is a valid context, then 
is canonical, and if r !-- a is derivable with respect t o  valid context r ,  then the terms in 
a are canonical with respect to  r ,  and a has one of the following forms. 
1. IIxl :A1. .  . IIx, :An.Type kind where n > 0. 
2. (Ax1 : A1 . . .Axn : An.IIzl : B1 . . . IIz, : B,.C) : (IIxl : A1 . . . IIx, : An.Type) where 
n, m 2 0 and C is a base type. 
3. (Axl : A1 . . .Axn : An.N) : (IIxl : A1 . . . IIx, : An.B) where n 2 0, N is not an 
abstraction, and B is a base type. 
Note that proving an assertion of the form given by (2) or (3), respectively, in valid 
context I?, is equivalent to proving J?, XI  :Al,  . . . , z n  :An I- IIzl : B1 . . . Hz, : B,.C : Type 
or r ,  x1 : A1, . . . , x, :An t- N : B,  respectively, in valid context I?, x l  : Al,  . . . , x, : A,. In 
the first version of the translation given in the next section, we will assume that assertions 
have the latter form, i . e . ,  that there are no leading abstractions in the term on the left 
in a judgment. 
4 Translating LF Assertions to  hhw Formulas 
In this section we present the translation of LF assertions to formulas in hh". This 
translation will require an encoding of LF terms as simply typed A-terms. We begin by 
presenting this encoding. We then present the translation, which given an LF assertion, 
I? t- a where r is a valid context, translates r to  a set of hh" formulas and a to  a formula 
t o  be proved from this set of formulas. We then illustrate how to  extend the translation 
to  obtain a formula whose proof (from no assumptions) verifies that J? is a valid context 
before proving that a holds within the context r .  
Since both LF and the meta-language have types and terms, to  avoid confusion we 
will refer to types and terms of the meta-language as meta-types and meta-terms. We 
only define the encoding of LF terms as simply typed A-terms for LF objects and flat 
types/type families since this is all that is required by the translation. We introduce 
two base types, tm and t y ,  at the meta-level for these two classes of LF terms. First, to  
encode object-level variables, we define the function @ that maps LF types and kinds to 
meta-types containing only occurrences of t m  and ty .  
@ ( n x : A . P )  := @ ( A )  + @ ( P )  
@(Type) := t y  
@ ( A )  := trn when A is a flat type 
Using this function, an LF variable of kind or type P is mapped to  a meta-variable of 
type @(P) .  These meta-types encode the "syntactic structure" of the corresponding LF 
dependent type or kind. Information about dependencies is lost in this mapping, but as 
we will see later, this information is retained in a different form in performing the general 
translation. We will assume a fixed mapping from LF variables to meta-variables of the 
corresponding type. For readability in our presentation, this mapping will be implicit. 
A variable x will represent both an LF variable with kind or type P and a meta-variable 
of the corresponding syntactic type @(P) .  It  will always be clear from context which is 
meant. Note that for type or kind P and object N ,  @ ( P )  = @ ( ( [ N / X ] P ) ~ ) .  
We denote the encoding of term or flat type P as ( P ) ) .  The full encoding is defined 
below. 
((2)) := x 
A x :  A M  := Ax :@(A) . ( (M))  
( M N I  := ( (MI  ((N)) 
((AM)) := (A)) ((MI 
Note that the encoding maps abstraction in LF objects directly to abstraction at the 
meta-level, and that both application of objects to objects and application of type families 
t o  objects are mapped directly to application at the meta-level. The difference at  the 
meta-level is that the former application will be a meta-term with target type t m  while 
the latter application will be a meta-term with target type ty .  
It  is easy to see that for object or type family P having, respectively, type or kind Q, 
((P))  is a meta-term of meta-type a(&). The following two properties also hold for this 
encoding. 
Lemma 4.1 Let P be an LF object or flat type, and N an LF object. Then 
Lemma 4.2 Let P and Q be two LF objects or flat types. If P =p Q ,  then ((P)) =p ((Q)). 
We are now ready to define the translation. Two predicates will appear in the atomic 
hhw formulas resulting from the translation: has t ype  of type t m  -+ t y  --t o and i s t ype  
of type t y  --r o. We will name the signature containing these two predicates ELF.  We 
denote the translation of the context item or judgment a as [a]. The full translation is 
defined in Figure 3. It is a partial function since it is defined by cases and undefined when 
no case applies. It will in fact always be defined on contexts and judgments in provable 
LF assertions. In proving properties of the translation, we will only consider canonical 
judgments and context items. Note that in a canonical context item x : P ,  the variable 
x is not necessarily canonical since it may not be fully applied. Such judgments with 
[M : IIx:A.B] := VqAlx ( ( x : ~ ]  2 [Mx : B]) 
[M : A] := has type  ( ( M )  ((A) where A is a base type. 
[B : IIx:A.K] := VD(Alx ([x :A] 3 (Bx : KJ) 
[A : Type] := i s type  ((A)) where A is a base type. 
[IIx:A.B:Type] := [A:Type]hVD(,)x ( [ x : ~ ] 3 [ B : ~ y p e ] )  
[Type kind] := T 
[IIx : A.K kind] := [A : Type] h Va(A)x ([x :A] 3 [I( kind]) 
Figure 3: Translation of LF Judgments to hhw Formulas 
non-canonical terms on the left are handled by the first and third rules in Figure 3. This 
translation maps occurrences of 11-abstraction in LF types and kinds directly to instances 
of universal quantification and implication in hhw formulas. In all of the clauses in the 
definition that contain a pattern with a 11-type or kind, the variable bound by II is 
mapped to a variable at  the meta-level bound by universal quantification. Then, in the 
resulting implication, the left hand side asserts the fact that the bound variable has a 
certain type, while the right hand side contains the translation of the body of the type or 
kind which may contain occurrences of this bound variable. The base cases occur when 
there is no leading II in the type or kind, resulting in atomic formulas for the hastype 
and i s type  predicates, or simply T in the case when the judgment is Type kind. 
To illustrate this translation, we consider an example from an LF signature specifying 
natural deduction for first-order logic. The following declaration introduces the constant 
for universal quantification and gives it a type: V* : (i -+ form) + form. (We write V* 
for universal quantification at  the object level to distinguish it from universal quantifi- 
cation in hhw.) To make all bound variables explicit, we expand the above type to its 
unabbreviated form: IIA: (IIy :i.fonn).fom. Note that by applying cP to the above type, 
we get (tm - tm) -+ tm as the type of V* at the meta-level. The translation of this 
signature item is as follows. 
This formula provides the following description of the information contained in the above 
dependent type: for any A, if for arbitrary y of type i ,  Ay is a formula, then V*A is a 
formula. 
We will show in the next section that if J? is a valid canonical context and a a canonical 
judgment where the term on the left in a is not an abstraction, then r t- a is provable in 
LF iff [a] is provable from the set of formulas [r]. (Here [a denotes the set of formulas 
obtained by translating separately each item in I?.) We now illustrate how to extend 
the translation to obtain a formula whose proof verifies that I? is a valid context before 
proving that a holds within the context I?. 
Proving that a context XI : P I , .  . . , xn : Pn is valid in LF corresponds in hh" to 
proving, for i = 1,. . . , n, either [Pi : Type] or [Pi kind] from 1x1 : P I , .  . . , xi-I : 
The translation in Figure 4, for an arbitrary assertion I? I- cr, maps the pair (I?; a )  to a 
single formula containing subformula. whose proofs will in fact insure that each context 
item is valid with respect to the context items before it. We also remove the restriction 
that the term on the left in a cannot be an abstraction. Variables bound by abstraction 
at the top level are treated as additional context items. The translation of such a pair 
is denoted [I?; an*. The first two clauses of this translation map each context item to a 
[x :A, I?; a]* := [A : Type] AVyr)z ([x :A] 3 [I'; a]*) 
(x : I<, I?; a]* := [K kind] A V m ( q x  ([z : K ]  3 (I?; up*) 
(();Ax:A.M : llx:A.BQ* := [A : Type] AVqr(*)x ( ( x : ~ ]  3 I(); M : B]*) 
[o; AX :A.B : n x  : A . I ~ *  := pa : ~ y p e ]  A V @ ( ~ ) X  (1. :A] 3 10; B : I<]*) 
[() ; a]* := [a] where the left term in a is not an abstraction. 
Figure 4: Translation of LF Assertions 
conjunctive formula where the first conjunct verifies that the type or kind is valid (using 
the previous translation), and the second conjunct is a universally quantified implication 
where the left hand side asserts the fact that the context item has the corresponding 
type (again using the previous translation), and the right side contains the translation of 
the pair consisting of the remaining context items and judgment. The third and fourth 
clauses handle the cases when the term on the left in a judgment is an abstraction. The 
last clause in the translation is for the base case: when the context is empty and no 
further abstractions remain at the head of the judgment. Then the previously defined 
translation is used. Thus, a proof of a formula obtained from translating an arbitrary 
assertion I? I- a with respect to an initially empty set of assumptions verifies that each 
context item in I?, and each variable bound by A-abstraction in a is valid with respect to 
those items that appear before it, and then proves that the judgment holds within the 
entire context. The correctness of this translation will follow easily from the correctness 
of the previous translation. 
5 Correctness of Translation 
We consider the correctness of the translation with respect to a slightly modified LF. 
Our modified system replaces the (ABS-FAM) and (ABS-OBJ) rules with the following two 
rules. 
These rules are the same as presented earlier except that the left premise is omitted. We 
call this system LF'. It can be shown that for valid context I?, an LF assertion r I- CY is 
provable in LF' if and only if it is provable in LF, provided that there is no leading abstrac- 
tion in the term on the left in a.  This result relies on the fact that in a proof in the mod- 
ified system, if an application of (ABS-FAM1) whose conclusion is r I- Ax : A.B : IIx : A.I( 
or an application of (ABS-OBJ1) whose conclusion is I- A2:A.M : IIx : A.B occurs above 
an application of (APP-FAM) or (APP-OBJ), it is always the case that A : Type is prov- 
able, and thus the left premise is redundant. The proof of this fact relies on a transitivity 
result for LF' similar to the one stated in [HHP87]. 
To prove the correctness of the translation, we prove a stronger statement from which 
the correctness of [ and [[ ]* will follow as corollaries. This stronger statement will talk 
about the provability of LF assertions of the form r I- a in LF' even in the case when 
I' is not a valid context. We also relax the requirement on a. The left term in a can 
be any object, type, type family, or kind, including one with a leading abstraction. To 
handle these cases in proving the correctness of [ 1, we must add the following two rules 
to the translation. 
[Ax : A.M : IIx : A.B] := VI(A)x ([x :A] 2 [M : B ] )  
We must then also add the restriction that the first and third rules in Figure 3 are only 
applicable when M and B ,  respectively, are not abstractions. 
One final lemma is needed to prove the correctness of the translation. This lemma 
applies to the translation extended with the above two rules. In Section 4, we stated that 
substitution commutes with the encoding operation (Lemma 4.1). We extend this result 
to the translation operation on judgments which translate to provable hhw formulas. In 
particular, the lemma below states that substitution and 0-normalization commute with 
the translation operation on provable hhw sequents. We will write @(I?) to denote the set 
of meta-variables paired with their types obtained by mapping, for each signature item 
x :  P in r ,  the variable x to the corresponding meta-variable and P to @(P) .  
Lemma 5.1 Let r , x l  : Al,.  . . ,xn  : An,% : A (n  > 0) be a canonical context (whose 
variables are distinct). Let N1,. . . , Nn, N be canonical objects with respect to r, and 
let C be the signature ELF U @(r).  Then C ;  [I'D F I  [ N  : ([N1/xl, . . . , N,/x~]A)PI) if and 
only if 
iIr1 I-I [(N11/~1, .  .  , (NnIlxn, (NIlxI[x : Ail. 
Theorem 5.2 (Correctness of Translation) Let I? be an arbitrary context (such that the 
variables in r are distinct), and let a be an arbitrary canonical judgment with respect 
to I?. Let C be ELF U Qj(r). Then I' I- a is provable in LF' if and only if C ;  [r] I-1 [a1 
holds. 
Proof Sketch: The proof of this theorem is constructive, i.e., it provides a method for 
constructing an hhw proof from an LF' proof, and vice versa. The forward direction is 
proved by induction on the height of an LF' proof of the assertion r I- a .  For the PI 
and ABS rules, we can apply the induction hypothesis directly to the premises to  obtain 
provable sequents to which we apply >-R, V-R, and A-R for the PI rules, and just >-R 
and V-R for the ABS rules to obtain the desired result. 
For the APP rules, we know the context item in the application of these rules corre- 
sponds to a formula in [I?]. To this formula, we can apply V-L followed by >-L n times 
in a backward direction. Each of the left premises of >-L can be shown to be provable 
since they are the result of applying the induction hypothesis followed by Lemma 5.1 to 
each of the latter n premises of the APP rule. Using Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, the formula in- 
troduced on the left in the right premise of the topmost application of >-L can be shown 
to be j3-convertible t o  the formula in the succedent (the translation of the judgment in 
the conclusion of the APP rule). Thus this premise is an axiom. 
The proof of the backward direction is by induction on the structure of the term on 
the left in a ,  and is similar to the proof of the forward direction. The regularity of the 
proofs in hhw described in Theorem 2.2 is required here. For example, the proof of the 
case when the term on the left is an application uses the backchain search operation. . 
Corollary 5.3 (Correctness of [ I ) )  Let I? be a valid context and a a canonical judgment 
such that the term on the left is not an abstraction. Let C be CLF U @(I?). Then I? t a 
is provable in LF' if and only if C; [I?] kr  [a] holds. 
Corollary 5.4 (Correctness of [ I)*) Let r be a canonical context (such that the variables 
in I? are distinct), and a a canonical judgment. Then I' is a valid context and I' I- a is 
provable in LF' if and only if ELF; 0 FI [I';a]* holds. 
6 Examples 
In this section, we provide some further examples to illustrate the correspondence between 
L F  signature items and judgments and the hhw formulas that they map to. Note that 
in general, formulas obtained by translating signature items have the form on the left 
below, but can be rewritten to have the form on the right: 
VT,XI (GI 3 . . .VT,Xn (G, > D) . . .) VT,XI ... VT,Xn (GI A . . . A G ,  > D )  
where n 2 0, TI,. .. , rn are types, X I , .  . . ,X, are variables, GI , .  . . , G,, D are hhw 
formulas. (Here we assume that for i = 1,. . . , n ,  Xi+l , .  . . ,Xn do not appear free in 
Gi). For readability, we will write hhw formulas in the examples in this section simply as 
GI A . . - A G, > D (or just D when n = O), and assume implicit universal quantification 
over all free variables written as capital letters. Type subscripts for these universal 
quantifiers can always be inferred from context. 
We begin by demonstrating the translation of signature items specifying natural de- 
duction inference rules for the A*, V*, and >* object-level connectives. The fragment of an 
LF signature specifying natural deduction for the first-order logic that we are concerned 
with is the following. 
i : Type 
form : Type 
true : form -+ Type 
A* : form +form +form 
>* : form +form + f o m  
V* : ( i  -+ form) +form 
A*-I : IIA: form.IIB: form.true(A) -+ true(B) + true(A A*B) 
>*-I : IIA: forn.IIB: form.(true(A) -+ true(B)) -+ true(A >* B)  
V*-I : IIA:i -+ foma.(IIy:i.tme(Ay)) + true(VcA) 
The signature item true is a function that maps formulas to types. LF objects of type 
true(A) represent proofs of formula A. First, consider the A*-introduction rule specified 
by A*-I and its type. Its translation is the following formula. 
(hastype A form) A (hastype B form) A (hastype P (true A))  A 
(hastype Q (true B))  > (hastype (A*-I A B P Q) (true A A*B))  
This formula simply reads that if A and B have type form, P is a proof of A, and Q is 
a proof of B,  then the term (A*-I A B P Q )  is a proof of the conjunction A A* B. The 
correspondence between this formula and the LF signature item is straightforward. We 
next consider a slightly more complex example; the translation of the V*-I rule results in 
the following formula. 
Vy((hastype y i) > (hastype Ay form)) A 
Vy((hastype y i )  > (hastype Py (true Ay))) > (hastype (V*-1 A P )  (true V*A)) 
This clause provides the following description of the information contained in the depen- 
dent type: if for arbitrary y of type i ,  Ay is a formula and Py is a proof of Ay, then 
the term (V*-I A P) is a proof of V*A. Note that A and P at the meta-level are both 
functions having syntactic type trn + tm. Here, A maps first-order terms to formulas 
just as it does at the object level, while P maps first-order terms to proofs. As a final in- 
ference rule example, consider the declaration for >*-I, which translates to the following 
formula. 
(hastype A form) A (hastype B form) A 
Vq((hastype q (true A))  > (hastype Pq (true B ) ) )  > 
(hastype (>*-I A B P)  (true A >*B)) 
This formula reads: if A and B are formulas and P is a function which maps an arbitrary 
proof q of A to  the proof Pq of B ,  then the term (>*-I A B P)  is a proof of A >*B. 
Note that P in this formula is a function which maps proofs to proofs. 
An example of a canonical judgment that is provable in the LF signature for natural 
deduction is 
XA: form.>*-I(A)(A)(Xz :tme(A).x) : IIA : form.tme(A >*A). 
Using the extended translation of Figure 4, we obtain the following formula: 
(istype form) ~VA((haslype A form) > (hastype (>*-I A A X2.x) (true A >*A)))  
which is provable from the set of formulas obtained by translating the LF signature 
specifying natural deduction for first-order logic. 
An LF signature specifying the reductions needed for proof normalization in natural 
deduction is given in [Pfe89]. As a final example, we illustrate the translation of the 
reduction rule for the case when an application of the introduction rule for >* is followed 
by the elimination rule for the same connective. The following signature items define the 
>*-E rule, the reduce constant used to  relate two proofs of the same formula, and the 
reduction rule for >* . 
>*-E : IIA:form.IIB:form.irue(A) -+ true(A >*B)  -+ true(B) 
reduce : IIA: form.true(A) + true(A) -* Type 
>*-red : IIA :form.IIB :form.IIP : (true(A) -+ true(B)).IIQ: true(A). 
reduce(B)(>*-E A B (>*-I A B P )  Q ) ( P Q )  
The signature item for >*-red translates t o  the following formula. 
(hastype A form) A (hastype B form) A 
V q  ((hasfype q (true A ) )  > (hastype (Pq)  (true B ) ) )  A (hastype Q (true A) )  > 
(hastype (>*-red A B P Q )  (reduce B (>*-E A B (>*-I  A B P )  Q )  ( P Q ) ) )  
This formula reads: if A and B are formulas and P is a function which maps an arbitrary 
 roof q of A to  the proof Pq of B ,  and Q is a proof of A, then (>*-red A B P Q )  is a 
meta-proof of the fact that the natural deduction proof (>*-E A B ( > * - I  A B P )  Q )  of 
B reduces t o  the proof PQ. 
7 Conclusion 
We have not yet considered the possibility of translating hhw formulas into LF. This 
translation is particularly simple. Let C be a signature for hhw and let ? be a set of 
C-formulas. For each primitive type r other than o in S, the corresponding LF judgment 
is r : Type. For each non-predicate constant c : r E C, the corresponding LF judgment 
is c : T .  For each predicate constant p : r l  + - .  . + r, -+ o E C, the corresponding LF 
judgment is p : TI -+ .. . + r, -+ Type. Finally, let D E P and let k be a new constant 
not used in the translation t o  this point. Then the correspondiiig LF judgment is k : D' 
where D' is essentially D where B1 > B2 is written as IIx: B1.B2 and V,x B is written 
as II2:r.B. 
In the first author's dissertation [Fe189] an encoding of LF into just hh2 was presented. 
Order 2 is all that is necessary if object-level applications are represented by meta-level 
constants. The proofs of the correctness of that encoding are very similar t o  those 
presented here. 
Notice that  the translation presented here works via recursion over the structure of 
types. Thus, this kind of translation will not work for the polymorphic A-calculus or 
the Calculus of Constructions since they both contain quantification over types. Other 
techniques can be used, however, t o  encode provability of such A-calculi into hhw. These 
involve coding the provability relation of those calculi directly into the meta-language 
[FM89]. 
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